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Discriminating Among Discrimination: The Appropriateness
of Treating Reverse Age Discrimination Differently from
Reverse Race Discrimination
"Old age equalizes-we are aware that what is happening to us
has happened to untold numbers from the beginning of time."'
Aging is a universal process to which there is no real desirable
alternative. However, American culture today seems more obsessed
with youth and looking young than perhaps ever before.2 Reality
television shows like Extreme Makeover,3 The Swan,4 and I Want a
Famous Face' allow viewers to watch people going under the knife for
multiple plastic surgeries, emerging as often-unrecognizable, younger-
looking, leaner, and more flawless versions of themselves.'
Pharmaceutical companies hawk drugs like Viagra that promise to
restore men's youthful sexual vigor.7 And across the country, people
attend parties where the main refreshment is an injection of botulism
toxin, or Botox, into the face to temporarily smooth wrinkles and
lines.' Undeniably, youth and looking young are in style.
Youth has also traditionally been considered an asset in the
employment context. Aging Americans have historically faced
1. ERIC HOFFER, REFLECTIONS ON THE HUMAN CONDITION 92 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Marco R. della Cava, Appearances Can Be Deceiving, USA TODAY,
Sept. 9, 2003, at 1D (noting that plastic surgeries and use of "non-surgical indulgences"
like Botox are on the rise, partially in response to and partially feeding the trend of reality
television shows in which participants receive plastic surgery and outspoken celebrities
laud the results of their own plastic surgeries).
3. Extreme Makeover chronicles the Extreme Team, a group of surgeons, dentists,
and stylists who make over participants through a litany of surgical procedures. See
ABC.com, The Show, at http://www.abc.go.com/primetime/extrememakeover/show.html
(last visited Jan. 13, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
4. The Swan focuses on transforming women who consider themselves "ugly
ducklings" through surgical procedures, physical training, and emotional therapy. See
Fox.com, The Swan, at http://www.fox.com/swan/home.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). At the end of the season, the show's
participants are part of a pageant whose winner is named "The Swan." Id.
5. I Want a Famous Face documents the "journey[s]" of people who choose
reconstructive surgery to look more like their celebrity idols. See MTV.com, I Want a
Famous Face, at http://www.mtv.com/onair/i-want_a_famousface (last visited Feb. 3,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
6. See Booth Moore, America, the Beautified, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2004, at El.
7. See Dr. Jim Taylor, A Second Coming of Age, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 2004, at
36.
8. See Caitlin Cleary, Wine? Brie? Botox?, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at El.
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challenges in the workplace, especially when competing with younger
workers.' Having difficulty finding a job when competing with
younger applicants occurs because younger workers are less
expensive to employ, and employers may believe younger workers
will be abler, more effective workers." Seeking to ease these and
other problems faced by older workers, Congress in 1967 passed the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the ADEA")." The
ADEA was designed to help remedy discrimination against older
workers based on unfounded assumptions about older workers'
abilities to continue to successfully perform their jobs.12 The ADEA,
which protects only workers ages forty and older,13 provides that "[it
shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.' ' 4
In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,5 the older
workers received the benefit for a change. A group of employees,
ages forty to forty-nine, 6 sued their employer after a new collective
bargaining agreement eliminated the employer's retiree health
insurance benefits program for workers then under age fifty. 7 Thus,
older workers ages fifty and older retained their benefits at the
expense of workers ages forty to forty-nine, who were protected by
the ADEA.'8 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
9. See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and
H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
90th Cong. 151 (1967) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.Ed 8/1:Ag 3/2) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Eilberg).
10. See id. at 45 (statement of Norman Sprague, Director, Employment and
Retirement Program, National Council on the Aging).
11. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
12. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).
13. See id. § 631(a).
14. Id. § 623(a).
15. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
16. See id. at 584.
17. Id. at 584-85.
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (protecting workers ages forty and older). Because the
employees ages forty to forty-nine were discriminated against in favor of older workers,
the District Court called this claim one of "reverse age discrimination" and, like all district
and circuit courts before it, held that no relief was available for such a claim under the
ADEA. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio
2000), rev'd, 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 581 (2004). A divided Sixth
Circuit panel reversed, justifying its decision on the plain language of the ADEA. Cline v.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 581
(2004).
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majority held that the ADEA does not permit reverse age
discrimination claims.19 In deciding that younger workers within the
ADEA's protected class have no cause of action under the ADEA
against employers who discriminate against them in favor of their
older coworkers," the six-Justice majority supported this
interpretation by referring to the "natural reading of the whole"
statute,21 the legislative history of the ADEA,22 and case precedents.3
Meanwhile, Justice Thomas assailed the majority's result, asserting
the Court's reasoning conflicted with its prior recognition of reverse
discrimination claims under other nondiscrimination statutes,
particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 24
The Cline majority ineffectively attempted to distinguish age
discrimination from racial discrimination on a purely semantic level,
suggesting that the term "age" used in the ADEA is not comparable
to the term "race" used in Title VII. Writing for the majority, Justice
Souter concluded: "Race ... [is a] general term[] that in every day
usage require[s] modifiers to indicate any relatively narrow
application.... But the prohibition of age discrimination is readily
read more narrowly than analogous provisions dealing with race
.... "I However, the Court's support for this conclusion is meager.
The Court simply insisted that when paired with the word
"discrimination," "race" is a general term while "age" is specific and
naturally refers to "old age."
26
19. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584. The Supreme Court's decision resolved a circuit split
between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. In Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, 296
F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 581 (2004), the Sixth Circuit became the only
circuit to recognize a reverse age discrimination claim under the ADEA. Meanwhile,
decisions holding that the ADEA does not permit reverse age discrimination claims
abounded. See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The
ADEA does not provide a remedy for reverse age discrimination."); Karlen v. City Colts.
of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Age Discrimination in Employment Act
does not protect the young as well as the old, or even, we think, the younger against the
older."); Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 941 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D. Conn. 1996) ("ADEA
does not bar discrimination against the young in favor of the old."); Parker v. Wakelin, 882
F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D. Me. 1995) ("The ADEA has never been construed to permit
younger persons to claim discrimination against them in favor of older persons.").
20. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584.
21. Id. at 586.
22. See id. at 586-92 (discussing the legislative history of the ADEA).
23. See id. at 592-94 (reviewing case precedents).
24. See id. at 602 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination based on a number of factors, including race and sex, but not age. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
25. Cline, 540 U.S. at 597-98. The Court made the same suggestion with regard to
distinction between the terms "sex" and "age." Id.
26. Id. at 596.
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In spite of the Court's unsatisfying semantic analysis, the Court
reached the correct conclusion in deciding to treat age discrimination
differently from race discrimination.27 Thus, while the majority's
responses to Justice Thomas's charge that the Court was disregarding
precedent are not wholly satisfying,28 the Supreme Court rightly
declined to treat age discrimination and race discrimination similarly
in Cline.29  Congress has treated age and race discrimination
differently in its legislation, broadly protecting people from race
discrimination in Title VII while treating age discrimination
separately, and in a more limited way, in the ADEA.3 ° In doing so,
Congress has recognized that the two characteristics-age and race-
are substantively different in important ways that justify different
treatment and different levels of protection from discrimination.31
27. See Elena Minkin, Comment, Flourishing Forties Against Flaming Fifties: Is
Reverse Age Discrimination Actionable Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act?, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 225, 266-72 (2003) (arguing before Cline was decided that both
Congress's and the Supreme Court's different treatment of race discrimination and age
discrimination justifies allowing reverse discrimination claims for race but not for age).
28. See Cline, 540 U.S. at 597-98.
29. In doing so, the Supreme Court also decided to treat age discrimination differently
from sex discrimination. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79
(1998) (holding that Title VII sex discrimination protections are available to men in a
same-sex sexual harassment claim). Sex discrimination is more analogous to race
discrimination than age discrimination. Some of the same rationales for extending
protections beyond the group for whose benefit the legislation was first enacted apply as
well to sex as to race. First of all, like race and unlike age, sex is an immutable
characteristic, one with which a person is born and for which a person has no individual
responsibility. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)
("[S]ince sex, like race ... is an immutable characteristic determined solely by birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon members of a particular sex would seem to violate
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility."). Furthermore, like racial minorities, women have historically
suffered from "pervasive, although at times more subtle" discrimination in education,
employment, and politics. Id. However, sex is also like age in that there are sometimes
legitimate reasons to discriminate based on gender because of biological differences
between women and men. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996)
("Supposed 'inherent differences' are no longer accepted as a ground for race ...
classifications. Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring:
'The two sexes are not fungible ......."(internal citations omitted)).
30. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000) (treating race and sex
discrimination), with 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000) (treating age discrimination). Title VII
was enacted in 1964, and the ADEA was enacted three years later in 1967. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub.
L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)). See generally
Minkin, supra note 27, at 266-72 (discussing Congress's purposes in enacting Title VII and
the ADEA).
31. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 9, at 449 (statement of Rep. Burke) ("Racial
•.. discrimination results in nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely
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The Supreme Court has also interpreted laws involving age
discrimination differently from those involving race discrimination,
always treating race discrimination with more exacting scrutiny and
allowing broader disparate impact claims under Title VII than under
the ADEA.32 With Cline as a guide, this Recent Development
examines the real differences between age discrimination and race
discrimination and the reasons the differences justify different
treatment of age discrimination and race discrimination in the context
of so-called "reverse discrimination."33
While some aspects of the Cline majority's reasoning are beyond
the scope of this Recent Development,34 the discussion of the
unrelated to his ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job seeker.").
32. See infra notes 82-144 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
different treatment of age discrimination and race discrimination).
33. Used here and throughout this Recent Development, the term "reverse
discrimination" means discrimination against a person or group that does not have the
characteristic for which the antidiscrimination plan was originally put in place (e.g., a
white person claiming discrimination based on her race). Cf. David S. Schwartz, The Case
of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative
Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 657, 662 (2000) (advocating limiting the
extent to which white plaintiffs could claim discrimination based on race at least in the
context of affirmative action programs and leaving such matters to Congress and the
political process). Schwartz, then, might prefer to treat race and age discrimination
similarly, at least insofar as treating them similarly means not allowing reverse
discrimination claims in any case. See id.
34. In deciding that reverse age discrimination claims are not possible under the
ADEA, the majority chose not to defer to the interpretation of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the agency charged by Congress with interpreting
the ADEA. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 599-600 (2004).
The EEOC's interpretation provided that "if two people apply for the same position, and
one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the
basis of age, but must make such decision on the basis of some other factor." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.2(a) (2003). The majority in Cline determined that Congress's intent in the ADEA
was unambiguous that the statute's protections were only extended to older workers who
might be discriminated against in favor of younger workers. Cline, 540 U.S. at 600. But
see id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (determining that Congress's intent in the
ADEA was unambiguous that the statute's protections attach whenever a worker over
forty is discriminated against based on age). Neither the majority nor the dissent
purported to decide whether the EEOC's interpretation in this case was entitled to
"Chevron deference," the standard of review applied to an agency's interpretation of a
statute that agency administers. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Under Chevron, if Congress's intent is unambiguous,
the court and agency must give effect to that intent. Id. But if the court determines that
Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue (e.g., if the statute is
silent or ambiguous on the matter before the court), the court, rather than construing the
statute on its own, defers to the agency's interpretation so long as that interpretation is
reasonable. Id. at 843. For a discussion of the EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA and
Chevron, see Tara-Ann Topputo, Comment, Finding a Hole in the ADEA: Allowing a
Cause of Action for Age Discrimination Among Employees Within the Age-Protected
Class, 29 DAYTON L. REV. 169, 179-80 & n.83 (2003). In Cline, Justice Scalia's short
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ADEA's history and purpose is pertinent and instructive. The
ADEA's history and purpose evince Congress's realization that race
and age are very different characteristics. Congress chose not to
include age discrimination among the forbidden forms of
discrimination under Title VII.35  Congress realized that
discrimination based on race is invidious and that there is never a
legitimate reason to discriminate based on race because race is totally
unrelated to one's ability to work or to learn.3 6  However, in the
context of age discrimination, unlike with race, "there [are] legitimate
reasons as well as invidious ones for making employment decisions"
based on age.37 For example, as employees age, "higher pension and
benefit costs" burden employers, making them cautious about hiring
older workers.3" Furthermore, some employers hiring for jobs
requiring a high degree of physical alertness or strength may need, in
the interest of safety, to make generalizations based on age.39 Instead
dissent included his assessment that the ADEA is ambiguous on the issue of whether
reverse age discrimination claims are available and that the Court should therefore follow
the EEOC's reasonable construction. Cline, 540 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Based
on the majority's and Justice Thomas's equally fervent arguments that the statute clearly
supports their opposing viewpoints, perhaps Scalia is correct. At least the Court should
have addressed the possible ambiguity and the reasonableness of the EEOC's construction
in turn. Although beyond the scope of this Recent Development, perhaps the fact neither
the majority nor Justice Thomas entertained the possibility of ambiguity in the language of
the ADEA indicates some ambivalence toward Chevron. This uneasiness with Chevron
deference appears in the Court's greater willingness to resolve statutory meaning at
Chevron step one to avoid any need to discuss an agency interpretation's reasonableness.
See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 532, 536 (2000) ("Increasingly, the Supreme Court has chosen to resolve interpretive
questions at Step One of the Chevron analysis. It frequently has done so by using a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation that finds in the statute itself an answer to
the interpretive question posed.").
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination because of
an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
36. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 449 (statement of Rep. Burke) ("Racial ...
discrimination results in nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely
unrelated to his ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job seeker.");
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT 2 (1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]. But see infra notes 133-44 and
accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has held that a form of racial
discrimination, namely voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plans, are not
prohibited where employers are attempting to remedy past discrimination by opening
traditionally segregated jobs to racial minorities).
37. Cline, 540 U.S. at 587.
38. Id. at 589.
39. See, e.g., Maki v. Comm'r of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 252, 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that because of "the safety risks involved in operating a school bus" and the
difficulty of making a case-by-case determination of the physical hardiness of school bus
drivers over age sixty-five, mandatory retirement at that age is appropriate and not a
violation of the ADEA).
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of including age among Title VII's protections, Congress called on
then Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz to study the issues relating
to age discrimination.4° The Secretary of Labor's report ("the Wirtz
Report") confirmed that age discrimination was a problem that called
for a legislative remedy.41 But the Wirtz Report made clear that age
discrimination was different in kind from racial discrimination in
large part due to the existence of legitimate reasons to make age
distinctions in the employment context.42
The Wirtz Report identified three general categories of
discrimination.43 The first category involved discrimination based on
feelings totally unrelated to a person's ability to perform a job.'
Though common in the race context, the Wirtz Report found that
there was no discrimination against older workers based on feelings
totally unrelated to their abilities.45 An example of this type of
discrimination would be an employer deciding not to hire or promote
an African-American worker simply because the employer felt
antagonism or animosity towards African Americans generally,
without any regard to stereotypes about qualifications or ability.'
The second category, "arbitrary" discrimination, was a common
problem for older workers.47  The Wirtz Report found that older
workers were discriminated against "because of assumptions about
the effect of age on their ability to do their jobs when there is in fact
no basis for these assumptions. '48 This arbitrary discrimination most
commonly took the form of age ceilings for hiring.49 For example, a
company policy would provide that the company would not hire new
workers over age forty-five (based on an arbitrary decision that
workers older than forty-five either could not do the work or that
they were not worth training) without any regard to individual
qualifications of applicants.5 0
Finally, the third category involved instances where there was a
legitimate relationship between a worker's age and abilities in the
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (2000)).
41. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 36, at 3.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 231.
47. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 36, at 2.
48. Id. (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. at 6.
50. See id. at 6-8 (reporting survey data on age limitations in hiring and employers'
purported reasoning for those age limitations).
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employment context.51 This kind of discrimination was unique to the
age context since aging may actually affect workers' physical
abilities.52 Furthermore, older workers also face the difficulty of
employers turning them away, not because of concern about the
worker's ability, but rather because seniority, promotion-from-within,
and pension and insurance programs place financial burdens on
employers that generally increase commensurate with the age of the
workers for whom these programs are provided.53 This third type of
discrimination, and the impact that increased costs associated with the
hiring of older workers have on hiring decisions, was included in the
Wirtz Report not because this type of discrimination required a
legislative remedy, as arbitrary discrimination did, but to point out
that, unlike race, there is sometimes a relationship between a person's
age and his ability to perform the job.54 Thus, some discrimination
based on age in employment is necessarily permissible in stark
contrast to the race context.
Congress also rightly recognized that age and race are
substantively different characteristics. The cadre of older citizens is
"one minority group in which We all seek.., eventual membership."56
At some point, everyone-people of both sexes and people of all
races, religions, and sexual and political orientations-will
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000) (providing an exception from the
requirements of the ADEA where "age is a bona fide occupational qualification"). No
such exception exists in Title VII for race discrimination. While not an exception per se,
Title VII has been held not to forbid voluntary affirmative action plans. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (2000); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204-06 (1979). There is,
however, a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") exception for sex
discrimination in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Thus, in this instance sex
discrimination looks less like race discrimination and more like age discrimination in that
there are sometimes legitimate and permissible reasons to discriminate based on sex in
employment. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333, 335-37 (1977) (applying
the BFOQ exception of Title VII for sex discrimination). In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court held that an employer could refuse to hire female
guards for certain areas of all-male maximum-security prisons. Id. at 335-36. The Court
reasoned that gender was related to the guard's ability to perform the job of maintaining
prison security. Id. The Court recognized, however, that the BFOQ exception in Title
VII "was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 334. In another case in which the Court refused
to apply the BFOQ exception to a sex discrimination claim, it noted that the ADEA's
BFOQ exception has been applied just as narrowly as Title VII's. See Int'l Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
56. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 36, at 3.
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presumably join the group protected by the ADEA.57 All will
therefore be in danger of experiencing firsthand some form of
arbitrary age discrimination.5" The same is not true of race; people
are born with racial characteristics that cannot be changed. 9 As such,
race is an immutable characteristic.6" A white person cannot know
what it is like to be African-American, and vice versa.61 In contrast,
everyone will age no matter what their physical characteristics are.62
Most people have family members among the aged, making us
naturally more sympathetic to their plight.63 Thus, it is more
necessary to vigilantly protect people from race discrimination,
because abuse "is more likely to occur against a group with which the
abuser has neither immediate nor potential affiliation. ' '6 Of the three
types of discrimination revealed in the Wirtz Report, discrimination
based on feelings totally unrelated to one's ability to do her job is
most prevalent in the race context but is virtually nonexistent for
age." Thus, the two characteristics, age and race, have major
substantive differences that justify different levels of protection from
associated forms of discrimination.
Recognizing these substantive differences and informed of the
Wirtz Report's findings with respect to the three different types of
57. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 269.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. For example, a white person will likely never experience firsthand the kind
of arbitrary and systematic racial discrimination that racial minorities experience from day
to day, whether racial profiling on the roads or at airports, or in the employment context.
See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (interviewing middle class African
Americans about their experiences and perceptions with traffic stops and noting that even
famous, wealthy African Americans like Will Smith, Al Joyner, and Johnnie Cochran have
been subjected to pretextual traffic stops).
62. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 269.
63. See id. It must be noted that in recent years Americans increasingly have family
members of different races due, in part, to adoption and interracial marriage. See, e.g.,
Tamar Lewin, New Families Redraw Racial Boundaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1998, at Al
(discussing multiracial families created through adoption and discussing one boy's early
understanding of race: "[B]oys were white like him ... and girls, like his African-
American sister ... had dark skin"); David E. Rosenbaum, Legal License: Race, Sex and
Forbidden Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at D4 (noting the increased social
acceptance of interracial marriages following the enactment of the ADEA in 1967: "In
1968, the year after the Supreme Court legalized interracial marriages, a Gallup Poll found
that people, by more than 3 to 1, still disapproved of marriages between whites and blacks.
The last Gallup Poll on the topic, in 1997, showed that two-thirds of adults approved of
them").
64. Minkin, supra note 27, at 269.
65. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 36, at 2.
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discrimination, Congress crafted protections from discrimination
based on age and race separately and differently. Rather than
originally including age as a protected class within Title VII, or even
later amending Title VII to include the aged among its protected
classes, Congress enacted the ADEA as an independent statutory
regime." Additionally, the ADEA's protected class is much more
limited than those of Title VII. 67 The Wirtz Report concluded that
the arbitrary age discrimination that Congress should seek to remedy
begins to affect workers at age forty-five.68  But after testimony
before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor showed that
age discrimination in employment becomes evident at age forty,
Congress chose that age as the lower limit for the ADEA's
protections.69 Thus, unlike in the race context, Congress chose not to
protect everyone from age discrimination equally.70 The ADEA's
protections explicitly extend only to individuals age forty and older,
whereas Title VII protects everyone.71
While the substantive provisions of both statutes utilize the same
language,72 Congress put in place exceptions in the ADEA that have
no counterpart or analog in Title VII. 73  With the Wirtz Report's
conclusions regarding legitimate discrimination on the basis of age in
mind, Congress recognized that sometimes age can permissibly play a
role in employment decisions.74  These exceptions to employer
66. Minkin, supra note 27, at 267.
67. Id.
68. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 36, at 6-7.
69. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,252-53 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
70. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591 (2004). Title VII
protects everyone from employment discrimination based on race or gender. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
71. The ADEA provides that its protections "shall be limited to individuals who are
at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000).
72. The ADEA's main substantive provision provides, in relevant part, that it is
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ...
because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). Title VII provides, in
relevant part, that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual ... because of such individual's race .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2)
(2000).
73. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540-41 & n.3 (2005) (noting that
there is no "bona fide occupational qualification" exception under Title VII that allows for
discrimination based on race).
74. See W. Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1985) ("Congress recognized
that classifications based on age ... may sometimes serve as a necessary proxy for neutral
employment qualifications essential to the employer's business."); S. REP. No. 90-723, at 9
(1967) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:90-723) (addressing the ADEA's exception allowing age
distinctions "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business").
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liability are set out in § 623(f) of the ADEA.7 5  For example,
employers may make decisions based on "reasonable factors other
than age, "76 and they may also consider age when it is a "bona fide
occupational qualification. '77  Employers may also utilize voluntary
early retirement plans that benefit older workers but not younger
ones (even those over forty). 78 Thus, built into the ADEA is the idea
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f).
76. See id. § 623(f)(1). It is unclear why the employer in Cline did not make its
decision based on a reasonable factor other than age, like years of service, and grant the
retirement health benefits to, say, all employees with thirty or more years of service. The
burden would have then been on the plaintiff to prove that years of service was a mere
"proxy" for age and that a correlation of which the employer should have been aware
existed between the 15roxy and age. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613
(1993). Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), requires a plaintiff to prove a
discriminatory intent on the part of the employer by showing that the employer knew or
should have known that the proxy factor was very closely correlated to age. See id. at 612.
However, even if the employer in Cline had used years of service in designing its benefit
plan, the plaintiffs could possibly have established that years of service was a proxy for
age. For example, the plaintiffs might have proven that the employer "supposeld] a
correlation between" years of service and age, and acted "on the assumption" that
employees who have fewer years of service "are likely to be" younger. See id. at 612-13.
The Court would then be faced with the same issue that ultimately was decided in Cline
where the workers discriminated against were the younger members of the protected class
and the older members of the class received a benefit. See generally Toni J. Querry, Note,
A Rose by Any Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet: Disparate Treatment
Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 530 (1996) (discussing age proxies in greater detail). If the plaintiffs
could not show that years of service were a proxy for age, however, the employer's
decision in Cline, if based on years of service, would be lawful under the ADEA. See id. at
552-55 (discussing the difficulty of establishing that a non-age factor is an age proxy after
Hazen Paper).
77. See § 623(0(1). The BFOQ exception has been construed as "extremely narrow."
See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412. Some courts have upheld maximum hiring age limits for law
enforcement officers as BFOQs, and others have struck these age limits down. Compare
Reed v. Reno, 146 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1988) ("It is well-established that the maximum
entry age for law enforcement officers is a valid exception to the ADEA."), with
McMahon v Barclay, 510 F. Supp. 1114, 1116-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a statute
forbidding hiring of police officers over age twenty-nine could not be defended as a
BFOQ).
78. See § 623(f)(2)(A), (B)(ii). In Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314
(7th Cir. 1988), Judge Posner suggested in dicta that if reverse age discrimination claims
were allowed under the ADEA, early retirement plans would have to be available to
everyone forty or older, an absurd result that could result in the extinction of the popular
early retirement plan. See id. at 318. Because of the exceptions in the ADEA, however,
some commentators have proposed that Posner and others may have overstated the risk to
early retirement plans. For discussion of these statutory exceptions and suggestion that
the exceptions should assuage fears that allowing reverse age discrimination claims under
the ADEA would result in a slew of challenges to seniority systems and early retirement
plans, see Michael E. Franke, Comment, Age Discrimination Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: A Two-Way Street Blocked in One Direction, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 673, 677-79, 688 (2004), and Amanda Zaremba, Comment, The ADEA
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that employers may make legitimate age-based distinctions that
'favor the aged over the young."79 No analogous exceptions are built
into Title VII, precisely because Congress intended Title VII to
protect all people from discrimination based on race in employment. 80
On the other hand, the ADEA was promulgated principally to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination based on stereotypes about
older workers' abilities and not distinctions related to other,
legitimate factors such as pension status.81
In addition to Congress's different treatment of age and race
discrimination, the Supreme Court has consistently treated the two
types of discrimination differently. In equal protection cases, the
Supreme Court considers race a suspect classification and requires
and Reverse Age Discrimination: The Realities and Implications of Cline v. General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 411-12 (2003). However, neither
article addresses the notion that the very authorization of minimum age requirements for
eligibility for certain early retirement plans under ADEA evinces Congress's intention not
to protect younger workers within the protected class from discrimination in favor of their
older peers. See § 623(l)(1)(a) (allowing employers to set a minimum age as a condition of
eligibility for retirement benefits).
79. See Neil H. Abramson, Early Retirement Incentives Under the ADEA, 11 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 323, 351 n.157 (1989) ("Insofar as seniority systems by their very design favor
older employees over younger ones, Congress in the [ADEA] has expressed at least tacit
approval of employment institutions that favor the aged over the young."). The majority
in Cline also listed a litany of federal statutes for which "unwelcome discord" would be
introduced were the ADEA interpreted to provide a cause of action for younger workers
discriminated against in favor of their older peers. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 597 n.9 (2004) (noting several Tax Code and Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") provisions that allow for special benefits for older
workers based on the attainment of a certain age, including 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(28)(B)
(2004), which requires "an employer to allow certain employees who reach age 55 to
diversify their stock ownership plans in part").
80. See Abramson, supra note 79, at 351 n.157.
81. See id. at 351. Arbitrary discrimination based upon age involves employers'
erroneous beliefs that "productivity and competence decline with old age." See Hazen
Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (holding that there is no violation of the ADEA in firing an
employee whose pension is to vest soon because pension status and age are "analytically
distinct," even though the status of being close to vesting would not occur without
advanced years). Thus, if that particular forbidden stereotype is not the basis for an
employer's decision to discriminate against older workers, there is no ADEA violation.
See id. at 612 (noting that there may be some other violation, such as an ERISA violation,
if the employer discriminates on the basis of some other prohibited stereotype or factor).
When an employer gives a benefit to an older worker at the expense of a younger worker,
even one within the ADEA's protected class, the stereotype that productivity declines
with age is not playing into the decision. In Cline, the employer instituted a discriminatory
program where an employee's age determined whether or not the employee received
certain benefits. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584. But since older workers within the ADEA's
protected class received the benefit, the employer's decision could not have been based on
the impermissible stereotype of the older, faltering worker.
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courts to strictly scrutinize laws making distinctions based on race. 2
Among other reasons justifying strict scrutiny, the Court has focused
on the fact that race is an immutable trait83 and also that racial
minorities are among the "discrete and insular minorities" without
effective access to the political process.' On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has rejected arguments that age should be a suspect
classification entitled to greater judicial scrutiny. A person's age is
naturally always changing and thus is not immutable, even if a person
cannot voluntarily change his or her age like one can his political
party affiliation or domicile.86 Furthermore, older people are not
"discrete and insular minorities" who are shut out of the political
process and are thus in need of greater judicial protection.87 In
applying only rational basis review to uphold a state law requiring
mandatory retirement of police officers at age fifty, the Supreme
82. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("We have held that all
racial classifications imposed by government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.' This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests." (internal citations
omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("At the very least, the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ... be subjected to the most rigid
scrutiny."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880) (holding that a West
Virginia statute prohibiting African Americans from serving on juries violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In equal protection cases,
discrimination based on sex is also subject to heightened scrutiny. But where race
classifications receive strict scrutiny, gender classifications only receive intermediate
scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). Cline and the other nondiscrimination cases discussed in this Recent
Development are not equal protection cases, but the Court's treatment of the
classifications is instructive. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 270-72. The Court's equal
protection jurisprudence provides a developed analysis and justifications for why certain
groups require protection and what levels of protection are available for different groups.
83. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-62 (1978) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
84. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
85. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) ("[A]ge is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.").
86. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 269-70.
87. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. The Court specifically compared race and gender with
age and determined that the latter characteristic is very different from both race and
gender:
Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot
be characterized as "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy." Older persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on
the basis of race or gender, have not been subjected to a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment." Old age also does not define a discrete and insular minority
because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Court stated:
[Aged] persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated
against on the basis of race ... have not experienced a "history
of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities.... [Old age] marks a stage that
each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.18
Courts thus afford legislatures great deference when reviewing laws
that make distinctions based on age by applying only rational basis
review.89 The different levels of scrutiny accorded race and age in
equal protection cases further indicates the substantive differences
between race and age that justify the Court's holding in Cline.
Also, in cases interpreting the nondiscrimination laws of Title
VII and the ADEA, the Court has differed in the scope of claims it
has allowed. Two types of claims area allowed under both Title VII
and the ADEA: disparate treatment 9 and disparate impact.91 Under
88. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976). On the other hand, in
providing protection for workers ages forty and older, Congress could arguably have
created a statutory "protected class" under the ADEA. See Zaremba, supra note 78, at
405-06. This "protected class" of workers ages forty and over could be analogous to the
protected traits of race or gender. Accordingly, courts would have to give a higher level of
scrutiny to distinctions based on age within that protected class whether the distinction
favored older members of the protected class or only younger ones, since distinctions
based on race and gender always receive heightened scrutiny regardless of who is
benefited by the distinction. Even though age classifications merit only rational basis
review in equal protection cases, perhaps in the employment context Congress's creation
of a protected class should signal to the courts that more exacting scrutiny should be
applied to causes of action for age discrimination under the ADEA, no matter which way
the discrimination runs. See id. at 405-07. But not all protected classes receive the same
type, or level, of protection by the courts. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 271. Here, the
forty-and-over protected class was created in the ADEA, a statute enacted to remedy a
specific type of arbitrary discrimination and containing broad exceptions not available
under Title VII, the separate statute creating race and gender protected classes in the
employment context. See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
89. See Minkin, supra note 27, at 271-72.
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,609 (1993).
91. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005) ("[T]he ADEA does
authorize recovery in 'disparate-impact' cases comparable to Griggs."); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) ("Title VII proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
Until the recent decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005), it was not
settled whether an ADEA plaintiff would be allowed to make out a claim based on
disparate impact. See id. at 1542-44 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Prior to Smith, four circuits
had refused to recognize a disparate impact theory under the ADEA. See Smith v. City of
Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005); Adams v. Fla.
Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696,
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a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent on the part of the employer.92 The protected trait, whether
race or age, must actually motivate the employer's decision.93 But
under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff need only "show that a
facially neutral employment practice falls more harshly on the
protected group than other employees." 94 Because it is often difficult
to prove and employer's discriminatory intent, a plaintiff whose only
available theory is disparate treatment has a more difficult case.95
703-04 (lst Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
Furthermore, two circuits had expressed doubt as to the availability of disparate impact
claims under the ADEA. See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d
Cir. 1995) (opinion of Greenberg, J.) ("[I]n the wake of Hazen, it is doubtful that
traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under the ADEA."); Lyon
v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995) ("There is
considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate
impact theory .... ). However, the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continued to
recognize disparate impact claims. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (2d Cir.
1999); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997); Palmer
v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1986). Unlike Title VII, the ADEA does
not expressly provide for disparate impact claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)
(2000); Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609-10.
92. See No ADEA Liability for Employment Decisions Based on Nonpretextual
Factors Closely Correlated with Age: EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 37 B.C. L. REV.
374,374 (1996) [hereinafter No ADEA Liability].
93. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 ("[A] disparate treatment claim cannot succeed
unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the decision making]
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.").
94. No ADEA Liability, supra note 92, at 374.
95. David A. Strauss, Symposium: The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination
in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1644-48 (1991)
(arguing that in a world of "covert discrimination," "administrative costs of enforcing a
disparate treatment standard" and the "likelihood of errors" are great). Now, even
though the Supreme Court has ruled that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
ADEA in Smith, it is unclear what showing a plaintiff would have to make under the
ADEA for a successful disparate impact claim. In Smith, plaintiff police officers over
forty years of age sued the city of Jackson, Mississippi after police officers with fewer than
five years of service received proportionately larger raises than those with more
experience, who also tended to be older. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539. In addition to a
disparate treatment claim, the officers claimed that the City's plan adversely affected them
because of their age. Id. A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that there was no
disparate-impact claim under the ADEA. Id. at 1539-40. While clarifying that there is
such a claim under the ADEA, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that these officers
had failed to make out a disparate impact claim. Id. at 1545-46. Rather, the City's
decision was based on "seniority and position," which the Court found to be "reasonable
factor[s] other than age" ("RFOA"). Id. The RFOA language of the ADEA was not
mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hazen Paper, a disparate treatment case.
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2004); Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604. However, the result in Smith
is consistent with Hazen Paper, in which the Court held that pension status, though closely
correlated with age, was not the protected trait-age-nor was it a proxy for age. See
Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611. Under a disparate impact analysis, it is likely the Court in
Hazen Paper would have found that pension status was an RFOA. This conclusion is
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The Supreme Court's holding in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,96 a
disparate treatment case, put in doubt the availability of a disparate
impact theory of liability under the ADEA.97 In Hazen Paper, the
plaintiff Biggins's employment was terminated a few weeks before his
pension would have vested.98  Overruling the First Circuit, the
bolstered by the fact that in Smith, the majority held that "seniority and rank" were
"unquestionably" RFOAs under the circumstances. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546. Indeed,
it is difficult to think of an employer decision that could not be said to be based on either
pension status, seniority, or rank and thus, that would give rise to disparate impact liability
under the ADEA. Smith therefore may provide scant support for ADEA plaintiffs
making disparate impact claims; it is unclear what a successful disparate impact claim
under the ADEA would look like. See id. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
In her concurrence in the judgment in Smith, Justice O'Connor, who would have refused
to recognize a disparate impact claim under the ADEA, noted that the RFOA exemption
"strictly circumscribed" disparate impact claims under -the ADEA, because "the
challenged employment practice" need only be based on a " 'reasonable' nonage factor-
that is, one that is rationally related to some business objective." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment). It is useful to contrast the broad RFOA exemption with the
affirmative defense of "business necessity" that must be proved by a Title VII defendant
to defeat a prima facie claim of disparate impact. See id. at 1546. In the ADEA context,
once an employer offers an RFOA for' its action, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
"disprov[e] this assertion." See id. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Under
the "business necessity" test, the employer must prove there are not "other ways ... to
achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class .... " Id. at
1546.
96. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
97. See id. at 610-11 (reasoning that an employment decision based on factors other
than age is acceptable, even if the factor is correlated with age). Biggins, who was sixty-
two when fired, argued-and the First Circuit accepted-that his employer fired him to
keep Biggins's pension rights from vesting and that his age was inextricably intertwined
with that decision. See Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1412 (1st Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). If not for Biggins's advanced age, his pension would not have
been so close to vesting. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610-11; see also Querry, supra note 76,
at 548-55 (discussing Hazen Paper). After Hazen Paper, the circuits also began to refuse
to recognize disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543 & n.9
(opinion of Stevens, J.) ("It was only after our decision in Hazen Paper ... that some
[circuit] courts concluded that the ADEA did not authorize a disparate-impact theory of
liability."). But see Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting,
even after the Court's decision in Hazen Paper, that the Second Circuit analyzes ADEA
claims the same way it analyzes Title VII claims, "including ... disparate impact ADEA
claims"). Prior to 1993 and the Hazen Paper decision, courts seemed to hold that
disparate impact theory could be used by ADEA plaintiffs. See Abbott v. Fed. Forge,
Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Although disparate impact analysis was developed
by the Supreme Court in Title VII race discrimination cases, and has been used by the
Court only in that context, other courts have widely applied disparate impact analysis to
age discrimination cases brought under the ADEA."); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State
Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983). The reason given was the similar language of the
ADEA and Title VII, and the disparate impact theory was applied the same way as it
would have been in a Title VII case. See Abbott, 912 F.2d at 872; Leftwich, 702 F.2d at
690-93.
98. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 607.
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Supreme Court held that pension status, though a factor closely
correlated with age, could be used in making employment decisions.99
According to the Court, there is "no disparate treatment under the
ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature
other than the employee's age," such as pension status or seniority.' 1
This holding made it more difficult for employees claiming age
discrimination to prove the discriminatory intent that is requisite for a
disparate treatment claim. 101
The Supreme Court expressly refrained from addressing the
question of whether a disparate impact claim were cognizable under
the ADEA in Hazen Paper."° In spite of this, the holding in Hazen
Paper impacted the availability of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA, with several of the circuits refusing to recognize such claims
after Hazen Paper.103 The Hazen Paper decision included the strong
language that "[wihen the employer's decision is wholly motivated by
factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes" sought to be remedied by the ADEA "disappears."'0,
The very definition of a disparate impact claim is one in which a
plaintiff seeks relief because an employer's practice, motivated by
factors other than the protected trait, "fall[s] more harshly" on the
protected class. 0 Such practices motivated by factors other than age
but falling more harshly on older workers within the ADEA's
protected class-such as the practice at issue in Hazen Paper-were
seemingly deemed lawful under the ADEA by the Hazen Paper
decision." Even Justice Kennedy's concurrence indicated that he,
99. See id. at 611. The Court pointed out the possibility of other bases for liability for
an employer who fires an employee because his pension is close to vesting (e.g., liability
under ERISA). Id. at 612.
100. Id. at 609.
101. See Querry, supra note 76, at 552-55 (noting that an "employer rarely waves a red
flag announcing his or her discriminatory intent").
102. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
103. See supra note 97.
104. Hazen Paper, 504 U.S. at 611.
105. See id. at 609.
106. See id. at 611-12. After Hazen Paper, the circuit courts that refused to recognize
disparate impact claims under the ADEA did so because they read the decision to allow
for employers to make decisions motivated by factors other than age, which is exactly
what a disparate impact claim attacks. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Corp., 164 F.3d 696,
700-01 (1st Cir. 1999). As the First Circuit noted:
Since disparate impact claims encompass the precise scenario that [the Court]
describes-disparate impact assigns liability when employment practices are
grounded in factors other than the statutorily protected characteristic (say, age),
yet fall more harshly on individuals within the precluded group (say, older
persons)-the inescapable implication of [the Court's] statements is that the
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas, who both joined him,
would be reluctant to "carry over disparate impact analysis from Title
VII to the ADEA.' 10 7 Thus, lower courts' reading of Hazen Paper to
effectively, if not explicitly, foreclose disparate impact claims for
ADEA plaintiffs, was quite reasonable. 18
In Smith v. City of Jackson,1" a majority of the Supreme Court
clarified that while disparate impact claims are possible under the
ADEA, such claims are narrower in scope than cognizable disparate
impact claims under Title VII.110 Disparate impact claims under the
ADEA cannot proceed where the practice at issue is based on
"reasonable factors other than age." '' Under the test announced by
the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio,"2 the
"employer's exposure to liability on a disparate-impact theory" was
"narrowly construed." '113 While Wards Cove no longer governs Title
VII cases,114 its interpretation of disparate impact claims "remains
applicable to the ADEA." 5 Under Wards Cove and thus under the
ADEA, a plaintiff employee must "isolat[e] and identify[] the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities.11 6  Alleging simply that there is a disparate
impact on employees because of some "generalized policy" is not
imposition of disparate impact liability would not address the evils that Congress
was attempting to purge when it enacted the ADEA.
Id.
107. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, in Smith, Justices
Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice O'Connor in a concurrence in the judgment in which
she indicated that she would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit on the ground that the ADEA
does not authorize disparate impact claims. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536,
1549 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part
in the decision of the case. See id. at 1546. If his joining Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Hazen Paper is any indication, the Chief Justice would have provided a fourth vote for
Justice O'Connor's position.
108. But see Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (asserting that nothing the
Court said in Hazen Paper purported to "address or comment on" disparate impact claims
under the ADEA).
109. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
110. Id. at 1544.
111. See id. at 1546.
112. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
113. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545; see Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-67.
114. In 1991, Title VII was amended to broaden its coverage and to specifically provide
for disparate-impact claims. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat.
1071, 1074-75 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)-(C) (2000)). A reason for
this amendment was to "modify the Court's holding in Wards Cove ...." Smith, 125 S. Ct.
at 1544-45.
115. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
116. See id. at 1545 (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656).
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sufficient."7 In contrast, under Title VII, if a plaintiff proves that a
facially neutral employment practice burdens the protected group
more than others, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the
employer to prove that the practice is "job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.""'
The Smith majority recognized that the scope of disparate impact
claims allowed under Title VII is broader than those allowed under
the ADEA because, "[u]nlike the business necessity test, which asks
whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals
that do not result in disparate impact on a protected class, the
reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.""' 9  The
majority indicated "two textual differences" between the ADEA and
Title VII that support the holding that "the scope of disparate-impact
liability under [the] ADEA is narrower than under Title VII. '"'2
First, when Title VII was amended in 1991 to explicitly provide for
disparate impact claims,"' the ADEA was not amended to the same
effect. 2 2  Second, the ADEA's allowance of employment decisions
based on "reasonable factors other than age" 123 reflects the idea that
"age, unlike race.., not uncommonly has relevance to an individual's
capacity to engage in certain types of employment.' ' 24  Thus the
117. Id. In Smith, the plaintiffs complained that the city's pay plan was "relatively less
generous to older workers than to younger workers." Id. But their failure to show "any
specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on
older workers" was fatal to their claim. See id. However, the Court went on to make clear
that even if the plaintiffs in Smith had identified the "relevant practice," the city's plan was
based on RFOAs and thus it could not be liable under the ADEA on a disparate impact
claim. Id.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (codifying how a disparate impact
claim proceeds).
119. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
120. Id. at 1544.
121. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)-(C) (2000)).
122. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45; Nathan E. Holmes, Comment, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Are Disparate Impact Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN.
L. REV. 299, 306 (2000).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
124. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545. Prior to Smith, the "reasonable factors other than
age" exception had been interpreted to "preclude[] disparate impact claims." No ADEA
Liability, supra note 92, at 374-75 n.7; see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d
1073, 1077 (1994) (citing the "reasonable factors other than age" exception as "evidence of
the ADEA's focus on eliminating decisions made based on stereotypes about age").
Justice O'Connor relied on the legislative history of both the ADEA and Title VII to
argue that there is no disparate impact claim under the ADEA. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at
1552-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). At the end of her concurrence in the
judgment, Justice O'Connor indicated that if disparate impact claims are allowed under
the ADEA, "they are strictly circumscribed by the RFOA exception." Id. at 1560
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Court's differing treatment of disparate impact under Title VII and
the ADEA further reflects the differences between racial
discrimination and age discrimination.
In allowing a narrower scope of liability under the disparate
impact theory under the ADEA than under Title VII, courts have
correctly discerned Congress's differing intents in enacting the two
nondiscrimination statutes. 125  Title VII serves "a broad remedial
purpose," that is, to remedy past discrimination suffered by minority
races, especially African Americans.126 The ADEA, on the other
hand, serves a narrower purpose: to stop the arbitrary age
discrimination that results from baseless assumptions about the
abilities of older workers. 127  The narrower purpose of the ADEA
justifies the narrower scope of its protections decided in Cline, even
though a reverse discrimination claim would have been allowed had
the case arisen under the broader Title VII.
Although it reached the appropriate result, the majority failed to
adequately respond to Justice Thomas's charge that in failing to allow
claims for reverse age discrimination under the ADEA, the Supreme
Court was reversing its own position on the application of
nondiscrimination laws.128  In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Corp. 129 the Court unanimously held that Title VII
protections were available to whites discriminated against in favor of
racial minorities, 30 even though the "principal evil"13' to be protected
against by Title VII was "invidious discrimination against racial
minorities. 13 2
But while Justice Thomas criticized the Court for failing to
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
125. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1542 & n.7 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (suggesting that while
Justice O'Connor's reasoning to support her conclusion that there is no disparate impact
claim under ADEA is unpersuasive, "we agree that the differences between age and the
classes protected in Title VII are relevant, and that Congress might well have intended to
treat the two differently").
126. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 1536
(2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision to allow a disparate impact claim under
Title VII in Griggs).
127. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1553-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
128. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596-97 (2004)
(responding to Justice Thomas); id. at 608 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority also
addressed Justice Thomas's criticism in an earlier footnote. See id. at 592 n.5.
129. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
130. Id. at 278-80.
131. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that
Title VII sex discrimination protections are available to a man who was sexually harassed
by other men at work).
132. Cline, 540 U.S. at 608 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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recognize a claim of reverse age discrimination under the ADEA,
even in the race context there have been cases in which the Court has
allowed reverse discrimination to continue.'33 While the Court has
likely not had its last Word on affirmative action programs,3 case
precedent indicates an acceptance of reverse discrimination in the
affirmative action context.135 In United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,'36 the Supreme Court held that a private employer's plan
setting aside fifty percent of new trainees' slots for African-American
workers was acceptable under Title VII, even though potentially
more qualified white applicants were passed over.137 The majority in
Weber pointed to the purpose of the Civil Rights Act to remedy past
discrimination against racial minorities by opening employment
opportunities where racial minorities had traditionally been
excluded.'38 The majority relied on a statutory provision providing,
"[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual...
because of the race ... of such individual." '139 Reviewing the
legislative history which included concerns that Title VII presented
too much federal interference with private business,14° the Court
concluded that Congress intended to limit this interference by using
the word "require" rather than "require to permit" in § 2000e-2(j).141
Thus, the provision did not preclude "all voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action."'4 Even in the race context, the notion that Title
VII prohibits all discrimination based on race yields to the legislative
purpose in remedying past discrimination against racial minorities.'43
133. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (holding
that Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious affirmative action plans from private
employers seeking to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job
categories).
134. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (noting in the public college context
that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time").
135. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
136. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
137. See id. at 197. The Court recognized that voluntary action on the part of
employers to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace was important to
Title VII's effectiveness. See id. at 204. But see id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, now Chief Justice, who voted with the majority in Cline, wrote in his
Weber dissent, "Title VII prohibit[s] racial discrimination in employment simpliciter." Id.
138. Id. at 203 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6,548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000).
140. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 206-07.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 208 (discussing that factors to consider when determining whether a
race-conscious affirmative action plan is permissible under Title VII include whether
"[t]he purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute" and whether "the plan ...
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As Weber demonstrates, the Supreme Court's nondiscrimination
jurisprudence in the areas of age and race is not nearly as
contradictory as Justice Thomas would argue.14
The Supreme Court in Cline properly held that there is no
cognizable ADEA claim for plaintiffs who, though over age forty and
protected by the ADEA, were discriminated against by their
employer in favor of older workers. The majority faced criticism
from Justice Thomas, arguing in dissent that the result turns on its
head the Court's usual view toward nondiscrimination laws.145 Justice
Thomas asserted that per McDonald, a Title VII case involving white
employees receiving less favorable treatment than an African-
American colleague, such laws apply as well in "reverse" as they do
when applied in cases featuring the type of discrimination for which
the laws were enacted. 46 The majority's response, focusing on
semantic differences in the perceptions of the words "age" and
"race," is incomplete, but a broader inquiry shows that the majority
came to the correct conclusion.
The problem with treating all nondiscrimination laws the same is
that not all discrimination is the same, and the differences between
age and race discrimination dwarf their similarities. While race
discrimination in employment occurs when employers base decisions
on feelings about race that are totally unrelated to one's ability to do
the job, age discrimination generally occurs in employment when
employers arbitrarily discriminate based on assumptions about how
one's advancing age affects one's ability to do the work.147 Further,
unnecessarily trammel[s] the interests of white employees"). Weber's holding is narrower
than Cline's in that the Court in Weber upheld a specific policy while in Cline it foreclosed
a segment of possible claims going forward. However, these decisions are both consistent
with the Court's treatment of age and race in general, and it is pertinent that not even in
all race cases does the Court strike down policies that discriminate, especially where the
discrimination at issue is reverse discrimination. Note also that in the gender context, the
Supreme Court has upheld gender classifications benefiting women if the classifications
are designed to remedy past discrimination. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.4.3 (2d ed. 2002). In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld a voluntary
affirmative action program in which gender was considered as one factor informing an
employer's decision on promotions. See id. at 619-21 (noting the plan provided that "in
making promotions to positions within a traditionally segregated job classification in
which women have been significantly underrepresented [the employer] is authorized to
consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant").
144. But see Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 608 (2004) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (asserting that interpreting the ADEA as not allowing reverse age
discrimination conflicts with allowing reverse race discrimination claims under Title VII).
145. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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Congress enacted Title VII and the ADEA separately and with
different purposes.148  Title VII protects everyone from race
discrimination, although its primary purpose is to remedy past
discrimination and lack of opportunities for racial minorities.149 On
the other hand, the ADEA's protections only extend to those forty
and older and have a narrower purpose: to remedy arbitrary age
discrimination in the form of stereotypes about older workers being
unable to effectively do their jobs.15° The broad exceptions found in
the ADEA for which no parallel provisions exist in Title VII further
evidence such a narrow purpose."' Finally, the Supreme Court has
consistently treated age and race differently in its decisions,
considering race, but not age, a suspect classification in equal
protection cases152 and allowing disparate impact claims that
necessarily require less proof on the part of the plaintiff more broadly
in Title VII cases than in ADEA cases.'53 For all these reasons, the
Court is right to examine different types of discrimination differently
even if, at first blush, its explanation for "discriminating" among the
types of discrimination is unsatisfying.
ANDREA B. SHORT
148. See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Cline, 540 U.S. at 608-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the
expansive interpretation of Title VII and arguing that the result in Cline is inapposite with
this interpretation).
150. Id. at 591; Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
151. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
153. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1544-46 (2005).
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